Internet Shutdowns

In most cases, governments want to control the Internet to control the political narrative. They view the Internet as a threat because it disrupts their control of information. They believe that social media, for instance, enables individuals and groups to produce and circulate alternative political narratives. The United Nations has explicitly defined government-led Internet shutdowns and censorship as human rights violations.
Governments adopt three general approaches to controlling citizens’ access to the Internet. First, and most serious, is to completely block access to the Internet on all platforms. This approach incurs significant social, economic, and political costs. The financial costs can run into millions of dollars for each day that the Internet is blocked. A Deloitte report estimated that a highly connected country would lose on average $24 million per day per 10 million population, a medium-connected country would lose $7 million, and a low-connected country would lose $0.6 million.
The second method by which governments restrict Internet access is by blocking content, typically by restricting access to particular websites or applications. This strategy is the most common, and it usually targets social media platforms. Governments generally adopt this strategy because these sites have become platforms for various forms of political expression that many governments, especially those with authoritarian tendencies, consider subversive.
For instance, in January 2019 Zimbabwe’s government blocked social media following demonstrations over an increase in fuel prices. The state argued that the ban was necessary because the platforms were being “used to coordinate the violence.”
The third strategy, usually carried out secretly, is bandwidth throttling. In this method, the government forces telecommunications operators or ISPs to lower the quality of their cell signals or Internet speed. This process makes the Internet and phones too slow to use. Throttling can also target certain online destinations such as social media sites.
There are numerous examples of governments attempting to control the Internet by employing these methods. We consider several instances here.

India
On August 5, 2019, India announced that it was removing the autonomy of its only Muslim-majority state, Jammu and Kashmir. The state had been autonomous since the 1940s. India planned to divide the state in half, with each piece becoming a federal protectorate.
India immediately shut down the Internet and mobile communications in the state, and banned social media sites. In March 2020 India restored slow-speed Internet access in the state after seven months of blackout, allowed 2G (second generation wireless communications; see Chapter 8) cellular communications, and revoked its ban on social media sites. With only 2G available, Internet and cellular communications were so slow that physicians in the region could not download material related to treating COVID-19 patients, nor could they disseminate the latest news on how to slow the spread of the new coronavirus.
On December 11, 2019, the Indian government approved the Citizenship Amendment Bill, which created a path for citizenship non-Muslim immigrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, but not for India’s Muslim minority. The next day, the government shut down the Internet in the state of Assam after citizens protested the controversial bill. As the protests spread, the government shut down the Internet in other states, including New Delhi. The government restored Internet service in about one week, although protests continued.

Iran
The Iranian government has been deploying a centralized national Internet for some time. The effort has enabled it to provide its citizens with Internet services while monitoring all content on the network and limiting information from external sources. Essentially, the government has assumed increasing control over both public and private connectivity in the name of national security.
In mid-November 2019 the Iranian government unexpectedly announced its decision to ration gasoline, causing prices to rapidly increase by at least 50 percent. International observers viewed the move as part of an larger strategy to mitigate the effects of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s economy.
When large-scale demonstrations erupted in response to these actions, the government almost immediately began to shut off the Internet for its citizens. Iran’s largest mobile network operators went offline as well. It took Iranian authorities about 24 hours to completely block the nation’s inbound and outbound Internet traffic. The government wanted to suppress the protests and prevent people outside Iran from paying attention to the unrest. The shutdown lasted one week.
One unfortunate result of the shutdown was that Iranians in the United States were unable to contact friends and family members in that country. A few people were able to use Skype credits to call landlines inside Iran to get in touch with their loved ones.

Myanmar
The National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in the November 8, 2020 elections in Myanmar (formerly Burma). In a coup, the country’s generals refused to recognize the results, claiming fraud. Thousands of citizens denounced the takeover and demanded the release of the country’s elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi. In response to the protests, on February 6, 2021 the military junta began shutting down Internet access overnight throughout the country. On April 6, 2021 the junta shut down Myanmar’s wireless Internet services. As a result, the only Internet access in the country was over fiber optic cable, which was operating at drastically reduced speeds.
A coalition of civil society organizations appealed to Internet providers and mobile networks to challenge the junta’s orders blocking Internet access. The coalition noted that these companies were essentially legitimizing the military takeover. As of May 1, 2021 the junta had not responded to requests for comment.

Bangladesh
In September 2019, Bangladesh imposed an Internet shutdown at camps for Rohingya refugees who had fled persecution in Myanmar. This action impeded humanitarian groups from addressing the COVID-19 threat. As of August 2020, the blackout remained in place, and it continued to jeopardize the health of the 900,000 refugees in the camps as well as the Bangladeshi host communities.

Results
Even though Internet shutdowns continue, there is little evidence that they actually work. Let’s consider three reasons why they are not effective.

Shutdowns often encourage dissent and responses that many governments consider subversive. They can create camaraderie among citizens that can turn into an even more powerful protest movement. One observer noted that an Internet blackout just drives people into the streets.
Governments damage their economies when they shut down Internet applications and services. Government-led Internet shutdowns cost the global economy $8 billion in 2019.
Due to the fast-moving nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, an Internet blackout seriously obstructs citizens’ ability to access the most reliable details on recent infection counts, social distancing measures imposed in their area, current medical information, and corrections to circulating misinformation. Blackouts also hinder the public’s ability to communicate with others and to call wirelessly for medical assistance. The bottom line is that Internet shutdowns cause tangible, physical harm.

Questions

1. Of the three methods that governments are using to control Internet access, which is the most effective at controlling internet usage?

2. Of the three methods that governments are using to control Internet access, which is the least effective?

3. Is Internet access a fundamental human right? Why or why not? Support your answer. Be sure to include in your answer what your day would look like without Internet access of any kind.